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Abstract 
 
In his address “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” Donald Davidson puts forth the notion of 
varying conceptual schemes. The variation makes relative the notions of truth and concept. Davidson 
argues against varying conceptual schemes via the construction of a system of translation between 
different languages. I argue that Davidson’s system, adapted from Tarski’s Convention T, is inconsistent 
with the requirements of the formal structure Convention T brings. In particular, it is shown that 
Davidson fails to uniformly apply his notion of what it means to understand a language. Furthermore, it 
is shown that Davidson’s adaptation of Convention T fails to grasp the heart of Convention T: the 
removal of the Liar’s Paradox. While these problems disappear upon the repeal of one of Davidson’s 
assumptions, the cost of the repeal appears to be the loss of a working system. 
 
 
 
In his address “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” Donald Davidson puts forth 
the notion of varying conceptual schemes. The variation makes relative the notions of 
truth and concept. Davidson argues against varying conceptual schemes via the 
construction of a system of translation between different languages. I argue that 
Davidson’s system, adapted from Tarski’s Convention T, is inconsistent with the 
requirements of the formal structure Convention T brings. In particular, it is shown that 
Davidson fails to uniformly apply his notion of what it means to understand a language. 
Furthermore, it is shown that Davidson’s adaptation of Convention T fails to grasp the 
heart of Convention T: the removal of the Liar’s Paradox. While these problems 
disappear upon the repeal of one of Davidson’s assumptions, the cost of the repeal 
appears to be the loss of a working system. 
 
The argument begins by taking note of Davidson’s understanding of the connections 
between language and conceptual scheme. In order to show there is a single conceptual 
scheme Davidson sets out to show that all languages are mutually translatable. The 
problem of translation brings Tarski’s Convention T to the forefront due to the relations 
it provides between languages. Davidson adapts Convention T for the purpose of 
translation utilizing a metalanguage as a means to translate between two lower order 
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languages. Davidson then localizes the notion of truth to a point where a logical 
equivalence between two statements implies that the two statements translate into one 
another. Davidson then mistakenly identifies the subject language and the 
metalanguage in his Convention T style translation attempt. The identification leads to 
a paradox concerning the capacity to speak a language: the speaker of a language is 
shown to not have the capacity to speak that language while one who does not have the 
capacity is shown to have that capacity. Further, the identification of languages leads to 
the recovery of the Liar’s Paradox via iterated translation between two languages. 
 
Davidson understands languages to have an intricate connection with conceptual 
schemes. Davidson believes that different conceptual schemes necessarily yield 
different languages (“On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” 6). Davidson does 
not, however, claim that differing languages are sufficient evidence for the 
necessitation of varying conceptual schemes. Davidson believes that “speakers of 
different languages may share a conceptual scheme provided there is a way of 
translating one language into the other” (“On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” 
6). Davidson’s task is to identify which languages can fall under a common conceptual 
scheme. If he can succeed in identifying all languages with one another, Davidson will 
show that all experience thus far has been contained within a single conceptual scheme. 
Davidson encounters the problem of finding a systematic way of translating statements 
between two languages. 
 
Davidson turns to Alfred Tarski’s work with truth, in particular to Tarski’s attempt at 
removing semantic paradoxes from language. One such paradox, the Liar’s Paradox, is 
found in the attempt to evaluate the verity of the statement: “This statement is false.” In 
his essay “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics,” 
Tarski proposes a method, known as Convention T, for the removal of the Liar’s 
Paradox. Convention T relies on the study of languages which are not “semantically 
closed,” meaning that the language does not contain “in addition to its expressions, also 
the names of these expressions, as well as semantic terms such as the term ‘true’ 
referring to sentences of this language” ("The Semantic Conception of Truth” 124-125). 
Tarski does not permit languages in which the verity of statements of the same 
language can be discussed. 
 
Given the requirement of the utilization of such regimented languages, statements 
pertaining to the truth of other statements necessarily involve at least two languages. 
Tarski defines the object language to be “the language which is ‘talked about,’” and 
defines the meta-language as “the language in which we ‘talk about’ the [object 
language]” (“The Semantic Conception of Truth” 125). Given these distinctions 
between languages, Tarski proposes Convention T: 
 
 “(T) X is true if, and only if, p,”  
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where “the symbol ‘p’ in (T) stands for an arbitrary sentence of our object-language” 
and “the symbol ‘X’ in (T) represents the name of the sentence for which ‘p’ stands” 
("The Semantic Conception of Truth” 126). The idea is that, within the metalanguage, a 
statement of the object language, as referenced in the metalanguage by its name, is 
claimed to be true if, and only if, that statement of the object language or, equivalently, 
a translation of the statement of the object language into the metalanguage, is true 
(“The Semantic Conception of Truth” 126). In crude terms, the notion of the truth of a 
statement (and hence the capacity to discuss the verity of a statement of a language 
within that same language) is taken out of the language in which the statement is made, 
and is given to a ‘God-like’ metalanguage which has the capacity to speak of the truth 
of the statements of this ‘lower’ object language. 
 
Davidson recognizes Tarski’s relation between the truth of a statement and its 
translation into another language. Indeed, Davidson states that Convention T 
“succeeds… by making essential use of the notion of translation into a language we 
know” (“On the Very idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” 17). Davidson sees potential to 
utilize Tarski’s Convention T to relate two statements in order to claim they have 
equivalent meanings, thus bridging the gap between the two languages. Davidson trades 
Tarski’s language dichotomy for a trichotomy: “the object language, the subject 
language, and the metalanguage,” which are “the languages from and into which 
translation proceeds, and the language of the theory, which says what expressions of the 
subject language translate which expressions of the object language” (“Radical 
Interpretation,” 129). A Convention T style sentence within Davidson’s scheme is: 
 
 (T*) so is true if, and only if, ss is true 
 
where the symbol ‘so’ denotes a statement in the object language and the symbol ‘ss’ 
denotes a statement in the subject language. The words in (T*) connecting the symbols 
are words of the metalanguage (that is to say, (T*) is a statement in the metalanguage). 
With this structure, Davidson is able to relate two statements of different languages via 
logical equivalence. 
 
Davidson recognizes, however, that replacement salva veritate is not sufficient to 
demonstrate the equivalence of meaning. Davidson offers, as an example, the statement 
that: 
 
“(S) ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if grass is green” (“Truth and Meaning,” 
312). 
 
Statement (S) shows that just because two statements are logically equivalent, identical 
meanings are not necessitated. It is here that Davidson’s notion of truth as a property of 
a system of beliefs comes into play. Davidson believes that “determinate meanings” 
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cannot exist within a language (“A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge” 145). 
A lack of fixed meanings necessitates the contextualization of meaning into a system. 
The truth of a statement is therefore dependent upon what the speaker meant by the 
statement when it was made. Davidson states that “it is simplest just to view truth as a 
relation between a sentence, a person, and a time” (“Truth and Meaning” 319). With 
this notion of truth applied to (T*), we arrive at: 
 
 (T**) so is true for po at time to if, and only if, ss is true for ps at time ts, 
 
where the symbol ‘so’ denotes a statement in the object language, ‘po’ the speaker of the 
object language, ‘to’ the time at which so was made, and similarly for the other symbols 
as the corresponding statement, speaker, and time for the subject language. Again, the 
words in (T**) connecting the symbols are words of the metalanguage (that is to say, 
(T**) is a statement in the metalanguage). 
 
Davidson’s contextualization of truth appears to solve the problem of statement (S). 
Truth is placed into the context of a situation, an environment. Davidson sates that “the 
interpreter interprets sentences held true… according to the events and objects in the 
outside world that cause the sentence to be held true” (“A Coherence Theory of Truth 
and Knowledge,” 150). If the interpreter has access to the environment in which the 
speaker of the foreign tongue is located, the interpreter has the capacity to rule out 
statements such as (S) because the environmental clues speak against such 
interpretations. In the particular case of (S), one would not remark on the whiteness of 
snow if it is a warm spring day, an environment in which one is likely to comment 
about the grass. The contextualization of truth thus limits the possibilities of (T**) to 
the extent that Davidson believes a construction such as (T**) is sufficient for inter-
lingual interpretation. 
 
It is within the formalization of the process of environmental appeal into system that 
proves to be problematic. The first step in the formalization process is the identification 
of the metalanguage and the subject language. Davidson states that, “The only 
expressions a theory of interpretation has to mention are those belonging to the 
language to be interpreted” (“Radical Interpretation,” 130). That is to say, any 
interpreter using the theory of interpretation must understand the language of the 
theory. Given this, in an attempt to interpret, the interpreter must understand the subject 
language, that language which is his own, and the metalanguage, the language of the 
system. Davidson is brought to the conclusion that “the reference to the home language 
is superfluous” (“Radical Interpretation,” 130). The identification of the metalanguage 
and the subject language gives the speaker of the subject language the capacity to 
discuss the verity of statements of the object language. This discussion is carried out via 
statements of the form (T**), now to be understood as statements in the subject 
language and therefore called (T**)s statements. 
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The identification of languages proves to be problematic. Davidson claims that for one 
“to know what it is for a sentence – any sentence – to be true… amounts… to 
understanding the language” (“Truth and Meaning,” 310). This means that the speaker 
of a language must be able to determine the verity of a statement of that same language. 
(T**)s statements are statements in the subject language and thus, if the speaker of the 
subject language is taken to understand the subject language, the speaker must be able 
to determine the verity of (T**)s statements. But the verity of (T**)s is taken to be the 
repeated coincidence of statement with environmental state. The problem is that a 
speaker of the subject language, if he is to be taken to understand the subject language, 
would be required to be able to determine the verity of (T**)s statements, an 
impossibility if the speaker has not encountered the appropriate experiences. 
 
Allowing that the speaker of the subject language does not know the verity of (T**)s 
statements, the speaker needs a way to determine the truth value. Said differently, the 
speaker of the subject language needs a way in which to determine if he has given a 
correct interpretation of a statement in the alien tongue. Davidson accomplishes this via 
adopting “prompted assent as basic” (“A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge,” 
147). The speaker of the subject language would attempt to make a true claim in the 
object language, a claim which the speaker of the object language could confirm or 
deny. This is to say that Davidson allows the speaker of the object language the power 
to determine the verity of (T**)s statements. But again, if Davidson’s understanding of 
truth and its relation to understanding a language is taken seriously, then this 
presupposes that the speaker of the object language already understands the subject 
language. 
 
The tension which presents itself for Davidson is the understanding of what it means to 
speak a language. While Davidson is interested in the translation of natural languages, 
he has elected to couch his theory within a formal system of language relations. This 
system is designed to create a hierarchy of languages as a way of determining which 
languages are permitted to discuss which other languages. Davidson’s equating of the 
meaning of a statement with his contextualized notion of truth of that very statement 
makes it such that for one to understand (and thus speak) a language, one must know 
the truth value of each statement. Davidson cannot, however, utilize this notion of what 
it means to speak a language within the formal system. If Davidson imposes this 
definition of speaking a language within his formal system, he must apply it universally 
and without discrimination, something which leads to the aforementioned problems of a 
speaker of a language not speaking the language, and that of a non-speaker of a 
language having the capacity to speak the language. 
 
A further theoretical issue arises from Davidson’s formal system. Davidson has set 
himself to show that all languages are mutually translatable and has constructed, via 
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adaptation of Tarski’s Convention T, a manner in which to discuss translation from one 
language to another. Convention T was originally created in order to remove the Liar’s 
Paradox. A theoretically interesting question is then: does Davidson’s adaptation 
remove the paradox as well? The answer turns out to be negative. We come to see this 
via a process of iterating applications of Davidson’s translation formula. Applying the 
formula a first time puts the notion of truth of a first language into a second language. 
The second application translates that notion of truth of the first language as found in 
the second language back into the first language. 
 
We first suppose toward contradiction that all languages are indeed mutually 
translatable. If this is the case, then we note that any given utterance in a language may 
be translated into another language. More specifically, this supposition allows a 
language to be mutually translatable (directly or via a chain of translations between 
languages) with a language that has a notion of truth of the original language, thus 
necessarily allowing a notion of truth of a language within the language itself. To see 
this we demonstrate using two mutually translatable languages, one language denoted 
in bold the other denoted in italics. We start with an utterance in the italicized language: 
 
 Snow is white 
 
Since the statement (1) is in a language which may be translated, we may construct a 
(T**)s statement using the language denoted in bold as the subject and metalanguage, 
treating the italicized statement as the statement in the object language. This yields:  
 
‘Snow is white’ is true in Italics for po at time to if and only if snow is white 
for ps at time ts. 
 
But (2) is a statement in the language denoted in bold, a language which is mutually 
translatable with the language denoted in italics. We may therefore construct a (T**)s 
statement using the language denoted in italics as the subject and metalanguage, 
treating the bolded statement as the statement in the object language. This yields: 
 
 ‘(2)’ is true in Bold for po at time to if and only if Trans(2) for ps at time ts 
 
where ‘(2)’ refers to that statement (2) as a statement in the language denoted in bold 
and Trans(2) refers to the translation of the statement (2) from the language denoted in 
bold into the language denoted in italics. The important thing to note is that Trans(2) 
contains both the names of statements of the language denoted in italics as well as a 
notion of truth of the language within the language. With these ingredients the language 
is considered to be semantically closed. As was remarked earlier, Tarski identifies the 
Liar’s Paradox as originating from semantically closed languages. It is thus shown that 
Davidson’s adaptation of Tarski’s Convention T preserves the Liar’s Paradox. 
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It can be argued that Tarski’s aim is not the removal of paradoxes, but rather a 
systematized method of inter-lingual interpretation. While this is indeed the case, the 
existence of a paradox is enough to call any system into question. It is thus that the 
preservation of the Liar’s Paradox, especially after the utilization of a technique very 
similar to one created for the eradication of the paradox, shows Davidson’s system to 
rest on uneasy ground. While unsound on this theoretical basis, the method does seem 
to work in the same way that the common view of interpretations is understood: look 
and listen in order to try to figure out what the other person is saying. While language 
translation has clearly happened before, the exact process or system of understanding 
another language remains elusive. 
 
Reflecting on the problematic evaluation of (T**)s statements and the preservation of 
the Liar’s Paradox reveals that both problems vanish if the identification of the 
metalanguage and the subject language does not take place. For the evaluation problem, 
(T**) sentences return to a separate metalanguage and therefore do not necessitate the 
capacity to evaluate on the part of the speaker of the subject language. Furthermore, the 
principle of charity Davidson supposes no longer becomes the evaluating criterion of a 
(T**)s statement, but rather simply gives the truth value of the left hand side of the bi-
conditional in a (T**) statement. 
 
In regard to the preservation of the Liar’s Paradox, the iterated application of 
translation brings a notion of truth of ‘Language A’ back into ‘Language A’ because 
the notion of truth for ‘Language A’ is contained within a mutually translatable 
‘Language B’. If the subject language and metalanguage are not identified, the notion 
of truth of mutually translatable languages necessarily lies in a metalanguage, a 
language of higher order, which is not mutually translatable with the lower order 
languages. The fact that these metalanguage statements discussing the truth of 
statements in lower order languages cannot be translated into those lower order 
languages prevents the notion of truth of a language from returning to a language. In 
short, this makes it such that languages of the same level are mutually translatable 
while the notion of truth of these languages necessarily lies in a higher-level language. 
 
The problem with the lack of the identification of the metalanguage and subject 
language is that the sentences (T**) have no way to be evaluated. Davidson essentially 
relies on the native speaker to verify for the translator that a correct translation has 
taken place. Without the identification of these languages, the formal system 
necessitates a speaker of the metalanguge to verify a correct translation has indeed 
occurred. Within the constraints of the formal system, this metalanguage is one which 
can speak of the verity of both the subject and object languages and must thus be a 
language of a higher order than those languages. Because natural languages do seem to 
be mutually translatable, all natural languages appear to be of the same order. In order 
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to evaluate such a metalanguage statement as (T**), a speaker of a higher order 
language is needed—something nowhere to be found. 
 
If no such speaker of a metalanguage exists, we may never be able to truly understand 
what another is saying. While we can often get a good idea what another means when 
one speaks, it may be the case that this idea of meaning can at best asymptotically 
approach true understanding. If we can never understand something, then we cannot 
understand what it means to understand. If this is the case, all discussion of meaning 
and understanding will only leave the inquirers breathless and out of ideas on how to 
pin down these notions. 
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